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Sufficiency of Circumstantial
Evidence in Nebraska Civil Cases:
What Is the Test?
Danielsen v. Richards Manufacturing Co., 206 Neb.
676, 294 N.W.2d 858 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence is not evidence is not evidence. Evidence may be di-
rect, tending to prove or disprove an ultimate fact in issue,1 or it
may be circumstantial, tending to prove or disprove a fact which,
while not itself in issue, by inference tends to prove or disprove an
ultimate fact in issue.2 Because inference is an imperfect process 3
1. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 24 (3d ed. 1940); James, Sufficiency of the Evi-
dence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218,
219 (1961), reprinted in F. JAMES, Crvu. PROCEDURE (1965). Whether evidence
is direct is really a two-part analysis:
When evidence of a fact is in the form of testimony by a purported
observer of that fact, we call the evidence direct, as to that fact. And
where that fact in turn is one of the propositions which a party is
trying to establish as his side of an ultimate issue made by the plead-
ings in the case, or in any other way permitted by the relevant proce-
dural rules, then the evidence is direct evidence in that case.
James, supra, at 219 (emphasis supplied).
Evidence has been said to be direct when the inference of the truth of the
fact to be proved depends only upon the truthfulness of the witness. C. Mc-
CORMcICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 338, at 789 (2d ed. 1972).
2. McCormick described this as "a weighing of probabilities as to matters other
than merely the truthfulness of the witness." C. McCoRMICK, supra note 1,
§ 338, at 789. James implied that the distinction between direct and circum-
stantial evidence is artificial because all proof requires some process of infer-
ence before it can justify a decision. James, supra note 1, at 219. He was
resigned to making the distinction, however, because it is customary to do so.
See id. McCormick's distinction, therefore, is useful: based on the types of
inference necessary, it accommodates custom to reality.
3. If one draws an inference from an observed fact, one runs the risk of error.
Inference, by definition, is interpretive. It is "the act of passing from one or
more propositions, statements, or judgments considered as true to another
the truth of which is believed to follow from that of the former." WEBSTER'S
THID NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1158 (16th ed. 1971) (emphasis sup-
plied). The margin of error increases when more than one inference is re-
1981] CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 637
the use of circumstantial evidence in jury trials is accompanied by
difficulties which do not plague the use of direct evidence.4
Direct evidence nearly always is sufficient to carry a case to the
jury. The jury needs only to evaluate the witness's credibility to
determine the ultimate facts in issue.5 This does not hold true for
circumstantial evidence. In cases involving the use of circumstan-
tial evidence, a critical preliminary inquiry for the judge is whether
evidence sufficient for jury deliberation has been presented.6
quired to be drawn from a particular item of evidence. Recognizing this,
courts have adopted rules against piling inference upon inference. See C.
McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 338, at 291 n.39. See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 100
(1966); note 66 infra.
4. This is true although direct and circumstantial evidence are equally proba-
tive of any given issue. The United States Supreme Court has said that "di-
rect evidence of a fact is not required. Circumstantial evidence is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct
evidence." Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960). See
also Burns, Weighing Circumstantial Evidence, 2 S.D. L REV. 36, 36 (1957).
In Michalic, a seaman on a Great Lakes vessel sued for injuries he suf-
fered when a wrench which apparently malfunctioned fell on his foot. The
Supreme Court, reversing both the district and appellate courts, held that
evidence as to the fact that the wrench slipped was sufficient to make the
inference of the wrench's unseaworthiness a jury issue, even though there
was no evidence in the record of the wrench's deficiency other than the fact of
slippage. 364 U.S. at 330-31. Apparently, in federal court, evidence is suffi-
cient if the accident may have happened as the plaintiff claimed. This test
certainly is less stringent than any test employed in Nebraska. See notes 10-
14 & accompanying text infra. For more information on the federal test, see
Feldman, The Difference Between the Pennsylvania and Federal Test of Suffi-
ciency of Circumstantial Evidence of Negligence and the Choice of Law in
Federal Diversity Cases, 72 DIcK. L REv. 409 (1968).
5. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 338, at 789-90; James, supra note 1, at 220. This
assumes that the proffered direct testimony is reasonable. Direct evidence
may be held insufficient to get to the jury where the witness's testimony is
palpably incredible. See, for example, the classic case of Scott v. Hansen, 228
Iowa 37, 289 N.W. 710 (1940), in which the Iowa Supreme Court disregarded
testimony that a 1200-pound cow literally flew some thirty feet after being
struck by the defendant's car.
Statutory or constitutional law sometimes imposes additional require-
ments: in cases of treason or perjury, for example, corroboration is neces-
sary. James, supra note 1, at 221.
The jurisdictions agree that even where the plaintiff relies on direct evi-
dence, he must produce more than a scintilla if he desires to reach the jury. 9
J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2494; Long, Judicial Control Over the Sufficiency
of Evidence in Jury Trials, 4 WASH. L. REv. 117, 120-24 (1929). Nebraska has
adopted this position. See Langemeier, Inc. v. Pendgraft, 178 Neb. 250, 132
N.W.2d 880 (1965). That quantity of evidence which is more than a scintilla is
not necessarily an extensive amount of evidence. For practical purposes, any
credible direct testimony renders the issue sufficient to be given to the jury.
C. McCoRMcK, supra note 1, § 338, at 790.
6. At one time, the issue was said to be one for the jury. Long, supra note 5, at
121. This no longer holds true.
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Circumstantial evidence is sufficient when it enables the jury to
make reasonable inferences about the ultimate facts in issue; it
must be more than mere conjecture, speculation, or guess.7 If the
evidence is insufficient, the plaintiff loses on the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict. If the evidence is sufficient, the judge
gives the case to the jury. Sufficiency of the evidence, therefore, is
the judge-determined "burden of production" element of the bur-
den of proof. The other element, the so-called "burden of persua-
sion," is jury-determined.8 The test of sufficiency employed,
however, may strip the jury of its powers and duties, effectively
denying the substantive right to a jury trial while retaining its
form.9 The higher the standard imposed, the more difficult it is for
the plaintiff to carry the burden of production, and the more likely
the judge is to snatch the case from the jury. Thus, if the jury is to
remain a viable component of our system of dispute resolution, the
measure of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence must not be
set too high.
In Nebraska, it is not clear just how strong an inference must be
In every jury trial, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, when
properly raised by motion, there is a preliminary question for the
court to decide, not whether there is literally no evidence, but
whether there is any evidence upon which a jury can properly pro-
ceed to find a verdict for the plaintiff, upon whom the burden o proof
is imposed.
Bohling v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 141, 143, 214 N.W.2d 381, 383 (1974)
(emphasis supplied). Accord, Barkalow Bros. Co. v. Floor-Brite, Inc., 188
Neb. 568, 198 N.W.2d 329 (1972). This language on its face supports imposition
of the lesser standard for determining sufficiency. See notes 10-14 & accompa-
nying text infra. Apparently, in Nebraska the sufficiency of the evidence is
assumed unless a party by motion brings the issue to the judge's attention.
The proper motion to use is a motion for a directed verdict. EVIDENCE 1-35 (D.
Dow & J. North ed. 1966) (a publication of the Nebraska State Bar Associa-
tion). In resolving the issue, the judge is to look to what a reasonable jury
would infer rather than to his own, subjective evaluation. Id. at 1-1, 1-28
(quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2487).
7. The United States Supreme Court articulated this distinction in Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). The vague and indefinite nature of the test
has been criticized. See, e.g., McBaine, Trial Practice-Directed Verdicts-
Federal Rule, 31 CALUw. L. REV. 454 (1943); Note, Evidence-Directed Ver-
dicts-Inferences from Circumstantial Evidence, 34 NEB. IL REv. 102 (1955).
Nebraska adheres to this formulation. "Conjecture, speculation, or choice of
quantitative possibilities are not proof. There must be something more
.... " Popken v. Farmers Mut. Home Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 250, 255, 142 N.W.2d
309, 314 (1966).
8. The bifurcated nature of the burden of proof has been recognized since 1890.
Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARv. L REV. 45 (1890), remains the quintes-
sential exposition. The components of the burden of proof also have been
called sufficiency in law and suffiency in fact. McBain, supra note 7, at 461
n.15. This terminology underscores the notion that production is a matter of
law for the judge and that persuasion is a matter of fact for the jury.
9. See notes 70-74 & accompanying text infra.
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before the jury will be allowed to deliberate. A recent Nebraska
decision, Danielsen v. Richards Manufacturing Co.,1o which in-
volved a suit for injuries suffered because of an allegedly defective
surgical instrument, prolongs the confusion. The Nebraska
Supreme Court apparently affirmed its traditional holding" that
circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to reach the jury unless
"the circumstances proved by the evidence are of such nature and
so related to each other that the conclusion reached by the jury is
the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom." 2
Unfortunately, the court equated this "only reasonable inference"
standard with an inference "reasonably probable, not merely pos-
sible." 3 The terms, however, are not synonymous. "Only reason-
able iiference" amounts to "beyond a reasonable doubt," while
"reasonably probable" equals "by a preponderance of the evidence
presented."' 4 Use of the former standard obviously will keep more
10. 206 Neb. 676, 294 N.W.2d 858 (1980). For a detailed explanation of the facts,
see notes 17-54 & accompanying text infra. Also at issue on appeal were
questions about certain expert testimony presented at trial. On expert wit-
nesses and expert testimony in general, see C. McComcKc, supra note 1,
§§ 13-18, and cases cited therein; 7 J. WIGMORPE, supra note 1, §§ 1923, 1925, and
cases cited therein. These issues generally are beyond the scope of this Note.
But see note 33 infra.
11. Many Nebraska cases on the subject have stated the rule as it is quoted in the
text. See, e.g., Sherman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 Neb. 104,225 N.W.2d 547
(1975); Barkalow Bros. Co. v. Floor-Brite, Inc., 188 Neb. 568, 198 N.W.2d 329
(1972); Popken v. Farmers Mut. Home Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 250, 142 N.W.2d 309
(1966); Estate of Bingaman, 155 Neb. 24, 50 N.W.2d 523 (1951); Jones v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 141 Neb. 112,2 N.W.2d 624 (1942); Anderson v. Interstate Transit
Lines, 129 Neb. 612, 262 N.W. 445 (1935).
12. 206 Neb. at 681,294 N.W.2d at 861 (quoting Popken v. Farmers Mut. Home Ins.
Co., 180 Neb. 250, 255, 142 N.W.2d 309, 319 (1966)) (emphasis supplied).
Danielsen is not the first Nebraska case equating the two tests. See generally
notes 75-91 & accompanying text infra.
13. 206 Neb. at 681, 294 N.W.2d at 861. Louisiana and Georgia apparently are the
only other jurisdictions currently equating the two phrases. See Patterson &
Downing, The Burden of Proof in a Civil Circumstantial Evidence Case: More
Probable Than Not?, 23 LA. B.J. 263 (1976). Compare Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc. v.
Turner, 138 Ga. App. 205, 225 S.E.2d 765 (1976) (a reasonable mind would
draw the conclusion from the circumstances proved), with Underwood v.
Lowery, 133 Ga. App. 629, 212 S.E.2d 5 (1974) (certainty only to a reasonable
degree required).
14. If more than one reasonable inference is available, it is axiomatic that a rea-
sonable doubt exists. See 21 U. Prrr. L, REV. 561, 562 (1959). "Probable"
means "more likely than not," which usually means more than one-half. A
preponderance is but more than one-half, although many jurors think it
means something much more than that. Winter, The Jury and The Risk of
Non-Persuasion, 5 L, & Soc'y REV. 335, 337 (1971). Winter suggests that this
misconception results from the exposure given by the media to criminal
cases and from lack of exposure to the differences in civil cases. Id. at 338.
Equating "probable" and "preponderance" however, is not automatic: "the
jury might be more convinced that the evidence of one side is nearer the
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cases from the jury than would use of the latter standard; the for-
mer standard requires more of the plaintiff than does the latter.15
The historical trend, in civil cases, has favored use of the latter,
less imposing standard.16 Which standard actually is applied in
Nebraska must be determined by looking beyond the supreme
court's language to its practice.
H1. THE FACTS OF DANIELSEN
On September 5, 1976, a licensed practical nurse injured her
back while performing her duties at Saint Joseph Hospital in
Omaha, Nebraska.17 When discomfort from this injury continued,
the nurse sought treatment at Saint Joseph's on October 14.18 Sur-
gery was performed on October 28 by a hospital staff orthopedic
surgeon.19 During this operation, called a partial hemi-
laminectomy,2 0 the surgeon used a pituitary rongeur 2 ' to remove
tissue from near the patient's spinal cord. The movable jaw of the
rongeur broke off during this procedure and became lodged in the
truth than that of the other side and yet not feel that the evidence satisfied
them as to the right to recover." McDonald v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 109 Utah
493, 497, 167 P.2d 685, 689 (1946).
15. The inference sought to be proved is proved beyond a reasonable doubt if "it
is proved not only to be more probable than its contradictory but to be much
more probable than its contradictory." Adler & Michael, The Trial of an Issue
of Fact I, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1224, 1256 (1934).
16. B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 29:6 (6th ed. 1972). See, e.g., Console v.
Nickou, 156 Conn. 268, 240 A2d 895 (1968); Wiley v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 220
N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1974); Arterburn v. St. Joseph Hosp. & Rehabilitation
Center, 220 Kan. 57, 551 P.2d 886 (1976); Martelle v. Thompson, 283 Minn. 279,
167 N.W.2d 376 (1969); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Ozment, 434 P.2d 893
(Okla. 1967); Pulaski Highway Express, Inc. v. Terminal Transport Co., 493
S.W.2d 103 (Tenn. App. 1972).
17. Brief for Appellee at 2, Danielsen v. Richards Mfg. Co., 206 Neb. 676, 294
N.W.2d 858 (1980).
18. See Petition 5 (filed Sept. 14, 1977).
19. Brief for Appellee at 2.
20. A partial hemi-laminectomy is the removal of one-half of one or more laminae
of the vertebrae. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 714, 868 (21st ed. 1966)
(unabridged lawyers' ed.). The laminae of the vertebrae are "dorsal, plate-
like parts of the vertabra[e] which meet to form part of the vertebral arch
over the spinal cord." VI ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 10 (15th
ed. 1974). The operation performed on the nurse, Mrs. Dorothy IL Danielsen,
was performed on the intervertebral disc space of Mrs. Danielsen's fourth
and fifth lumbar vertebrae. Brief for Appellant at 8. Apparently, the opera-
tion is designed to relieve pressure on the spinal cord, thereby easing the
patient's pain. Mrs. Danielsen contended in her petition that a total
laminectomy was performed. Petition, supra note 18, 5. No explanation for
the discrepancy has been found.
21. A rongeur is "a strong biting forceps for gouging away bone." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1403. The rongeur used on Mrs.
Danielsen was a seven-inch straight-bite rongeur. Brief for Appellee at 5.
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patient's fourth lumbar vertebra. Despite efforts which prolonged
the surgery, the surgeon could not remove it at that time.22 After
the surgery, the nurse continued therapy and medication as an
out-patient, 23 but her pain did not abate. In March 1978, a second
surgery was performed to remove scar tissue from the nerve root
in hopes of easing her pain. During this operation, the mental frag-
ment was-unexpectedly--extracted. 24
On September 14, 1977, the nurse filed a petition in the District
Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, alleging that the rongeur was
defective in manufacture and that as a result of its breaking she
suffered severe and permanent physical injuries.25 The named de-
fendants were an importer/wholesaler of surgical instruments,2 6 a
distributor/supplier of surgical instruments,27 and the hospital.28
The plaintiff based her claims against the importer and the dis-
tributor upon theories of strict product liability, implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, and negligence. 29 She claimed
22. Petition, supra note 18, 15; Brief for Appellee at 3. Mrs. Danielsen knew that
the fragment had not been removed. In her brief to the supreme court, she
complained of the recurring nightmares she had suffered as a result. Brief
for Appellee at 3.
23. Brief for Appellee at 3-4. Therapy included use of a nerve stimultor, which
blocked out pain impulses before they reached the brain. Medication in-
cluded codeine pills for pain and injections of Novocain and Cortisone. Id.
24. Id. at 4. The scar tissue built up as a result of the prolonged retraction of the
nerve root during the unsuccessful attempts in the first operation to remove
the metal shard. Id. at 3.
25. Petition, supra note 18, 11 7-8.
26. The importer, Misdom-Frank Corporation, allegedly purchased the rongeur
from an unknown manufacturer in Germany. Petition, supra note 18, 1 5;
Brief for Appellee at 3. Both the defendant distributor and the other supplier
purchased all their supplies from Misdom-Frankl Misdom-Frank could not
deny that it imported the rongeur in question. Id. at 7-8. The manufacturer
later was revealed to be the Carl Martin Co. Brief for Appellant at 15.
27. The distributor, Richards Manufacturing Co., maintained at trial that it did
not sell the rongeur in question. Whether the evidence presented estab-
lished that it had sold the broken rongeur was the primary issue on appeal.
See notes 37-49 & accompanying text infra.
28. The plaintiff asserted a workmen's compensation claim against the hospital.
Petition, supra note 18, I 10.
29. Petition, supra note 18,1t 9(a)-9(c). The hospital moved for partial summary
judgment, seeking to be dismissed as a party for all purposes except subroga-
tion on the workmen's compensation claim. Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (filed Apr. 10, 1978). The trial court denied the motion, stating it
was unnecessary to force employees of the various hospitals around the city
to seek out strange hospitals or doctors, or otherwise to forego their causes of
action. The court held that Saint Joseph's and Mrs. Danielsen had dual sta-
tus as master and servant and as hospital and patient. Order (entered June 7,
1978). The hospital renewed its motion in February 1979. Motion of Sum-
mary Judgment (filed Feb. 14, 1979). After a hearing, the court granted the
motion. Order (entered Mar. 21, 1979).
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that the importer sold the rongeur to the distributor, which then
resold it to the clinic of which the operating surgeon was a mem-
ber.3 0 At the time of the petitioner's injury, the hospital required
its surgeons to supply their own instruments.31 The hospital
marked the instruments for identification and stored and cared for
them. 3 2
The major issues at trial were causation and liability: what
caused the rongeur to shatter, and did the defendant distributor
sell that particular rongeur to the clinic?
Plaintiffs expert witness 33 testified that the metal in the shat-
tered rongeur was unusually hard and brittle, indicating defective
tempering in manufacture.3 4 He also testified that microscopic ex-
amination of the rongeur's fractured jaw revealed two distinct
modes of fracture: one was a pre-existing crack, emanating from
the pivot pinhole of the movable jaw; the other extended over the
remaining surface.35 The defendant distributor's expert witness
agreed that there were two modes of fracture, but disagreed as to
the extent and cause of each type.3 6 From the force of this testi-
30. In its answer to Mrs. Danielsen's complaint, Richards Manufacturing neither
admitted nor denied that it had sold the rongeur in question. See Answer of
Richards Manufacturing Co. 3 (filed December 28, 1977). It suggested that
the rongeur had not been properly used and maintained. Id. 5. At trial,
however, it spent almost as much time trying to prove by circumstantial evi-
dence that it had not sold the rongeur as it spent trying to prove by expert
testimony that improper care was the cause of the rongeur's fracturing. See
Brief for Appellant at 9-39.
31. Brief for Appellant at 10.
32. Id.
33. The subjects of expert witnesses and expert testimony generally are beyond
the scope of this Note. For information on expert testimony, see generally
Gray & Hammond, Opinion and Expert Testimony, 49 Miss. UJ. 1 (1978);
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. I REv. 414 (1952); McDonald, Opinion Evi-
dence, 16 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 321 (1978); Philo & Atkinson, Products Liability:
The Expert Witness, 14 TRIAL 37 (Nov. 1978); Voorhis, Expert Opinion Evi-
dence, 13 N.Y.L.F. 651 (1967); Young, Opinions and Expert Testimony, 6 CAP.
U.L. REv. 579 (1977).
In Danielsen, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that there was no exact
standard for fixing the qualifications of an expert witness, that the trial court
had wide discretion in determining whether a witness had been qualified as
being an expert, and that where an expert testified concerning the informa-
tion that was the basis of his opinion, and was subject to cross-examination
on the matter, the trial court would not ordinarily abuse its discretion by al-
lowing the opinion testimony. 206 Neb. at 684-87, 294 N.W.2d at 862-63. These
holdings reflect the general practice. See generally C. McCoRmcK, supra
note 1, §§ 13-15.
34. 206 Neb. at 683, 294 N.W.2d at 862; Brief for Appellee at 15.
35. 206 Neb. at 682, 294 N.W.2d at 861; Brief for Appellee at 13-14.
36. Brief for Appellant at 31-32. The petitioner's expert said that the pre-existing
crack extended over 62% of the total fracture surface and that the final frac-
ture covered the remaining 38%. Brief for Appellee at 13. The defendant's
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mony, it was clear that someone was liable; the problem was estab-
lishing who.
The defendant distributor maintained that it had not sold the
defective rongeur and thus could not be held liable for failure to
discover the defect. The plaintiff claimed that the distributor had
sold the rongeur, but in proving this was forced to rely solely on
circumstantial evidence. No one, not even the operating surgeon,
could identify with certainty the broken rongeur as the one
purchased from the defendant distributor.37
The clinic's records showed that it has purchased only two
seven-inch straight-bite rongeurs in 1972,38 one from the defendant
distributor and the other from a supplier not a party to the ac-
tion.39 To overcome the inference that it was as likely as not that
the defendant distributor had sold the rongeur, the plaintiff sug-
gested that the correlation between the date engraved on the bro-
ken rongeur and the date of the invoice from the defendant's sole
1972 sale to the clinic identified the broken rongeur as the one sold
by the defendant.40 The defendant rebutted this inference by
showing that the hospital's engraving procedure was neither sys-
tematic nor uniform: some of the instruments were not dated at
all.4 1
expert said that the original fracture covered but 30% of the fracture surface
and that the final fracture covered the remaining 70%. Brief for Appellant at
32. Petitioner's expert was of the opinion that the improper tempering of the
steel and the presence of certain machine markings normally polished out of
the metal surface caused the rongeur to fracture. Brief for Appellant at 13-15.
This testimony obviously bolsters the petitioner's theory of liability. The de-
fendant's expert testified that the very extent of the final fracture (as he saw
it) plus the presence of certain corrosive residues (identified by him as being
dried blood) along the fracture surface established improper use and mainte-
nance as the cause of the breakage. Brief for Appellant at 35-36. All this says
much more about the potential uses and abuses of expert testimony than it
says about just what did cause the rongeur to fracture.
37. Brief for Appellant at 10.
38. The broken rongeur was of this type. See note 21 supra. Cross-examination
of the operating surgeon revealed the information from the clinic's records.
Brief for Appellant at 11. Identification of the fractured roengeur as one of the
two purchased in 1972 was based on comparison of the date etched on the
rongeur with the date of the defendant distributor's invoice for its 1972 sale of
a pituitary rongeur to the clinic. Id. at 13. See note 40 infra.
39. Both the defendant distributor and the other supplier bought their instru-
ments from the importer, Misdom-Frank. Brief for Appellee at 7-8. See note
26 supra. The defendant importer's liability, therefore, seems relatively well-
established.
40. On the rongeur handle was etched "12-20-72." Danielsen v. Richards Mfg. Co.,
206 Neb. at 679,294 N.W.2d at 860. The invoice from the defendant distributor
was dated December 12, 1972,'and it described a 7-inch straight-bite rongeur
as the item sold. Id. at 680, 294 N.W.2d at 860.
41. The rongeur offered in evidence by the petitioner as the rongeur sold to the
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The plaintiff also showed that the broken rongeur bore no dis-
tributor trademarks. Omission of such markings was the defend-
ant's practice in 1972;42 the other supplier, however, invariably
stamped its trademark on the instruments it sold.43 The defendant
established that certain markings on the broken rongeur were in-
consistent with its own practice, consistent with the other sup-
plier's practice, and otherwise inexplicable.44
At the close of all of the evidence, the defendant distributor
moved for a directed verdict.45 Even considering the plaintiff's evi-
dence in its most favorable light,46 it fell short of the "reasonable
probability" test, as well as the more stringent "only reasonable
inference" test. However, the trial court denied the motion and
sent the case to the jury,47 implicitly ruling that the evidence was
sufficient to raise a jury question.
The jury deliberated for two days but could not reach a ver-
dict.48 The trial court then declared a mistrial from which the de-
fendant distributor appealed. 49 The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed.5 0 The court dismissed the appellant's contentions that
clinic in 1972 by the other supplier was not dated at all. Brief for Appellant at
12. Petitioner contended that this other rongeur was the other 1972 rongeur
because it was the only such straight-bite rongeur stamped with the non-
party supplier's trademark. See id. at 11-12. The invoice from the other sup-
plier's sale was dated in September 1972.
The hospital's engraving procedure was more a service to the surgeons
than a systematic identification system. It was up to the surgeons to initiate
the marking procedure, and the markings were made to their specifications.
See id. at 11.
42. Brief for Appellee at 7.
43. Id. at 6. Other testimony, however, was to the effect that the other supplier
had sold instruments not bearing its trademark. Brief for Appellant at 20.
44. Stamped on the handle of the broken rongeur was "015." Brief for Appellant
at 21. The same "015" appeared in a similar location on the handle of the
other rongeur. Id. This "015" was consistent with the other supplier's vendor
identification code, id. at 20-21, and was not consistent with the defendant
distributor's practice, id. at 18. The supreme court made no mention of this
evidence in its opinion.
45. 206 Neb. at 678, 294 N.W.2d at 859.
46. Considering the plaintiffs evidence in its most favorable light is standard Ne-
braska practice, when the defendant has moved for a directed verdict. See,
for example, the holding in Popken v. Farmers Mut. Home Ins. Co., 180 Neb.
250, 255, 142 N.W.2d 309, 314 (1966). Even here, however, the plaintiff is sup-
posed to fail if several opposing, but equally reasonable, inferences can be
drawn from the facts. Id. Again, equipoise is not enough for the plaintiff to
prove his case. See note 62 infra. Danielsen may implicitly have changed
this. See notes 97-102 & accompanying text infra.
47. 206 Neb. at 678, 294 N.W.2d at 859.
48. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-3.
49. 206 Neb. at 678, 294 N.W.2d at 859.
50. Danielsen v. Richards Mfg. Co., 206 Neb. 676, 294 N.W.2d 858 (1980).
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the evidence was insufficient 1 and reiterated its language equat-
ing the "only reasonable inference" test with the "reasonable
probability" test.5 2 It then distinguished the cases on which the
appellant sought to rely:5 3 "We have closely examined the cases
cited by [appellant]. The differences in the nature of the founda-
tional evidence in the cases cited and that in the case before us are
evident. We will not discuss them."54
I. ANALYSIS
Discussion of the cases may not have been necessary, but it
would have proved useful in determining the court's exact holding
in Danielsen. An analysis of the Nebraska decisions is included in
this Note.5 5 First, however, an understanding of the development
of tests of sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is necessary.
A. Development of Tests of Sufficiency
1. In General: Distinguishing Civil from Criminal Cases
The trial system preserves order in society by providing a
means of orderly dispute resolution.5 6 Dispute resolution is or-
derly because it focuses on reaching results acceptable to both the
litigants and the spectators. Acceptability of these results depends
not necessarily upon trust in the correctness of the verdict in any
given case, but rather upon trust in the propriety of the processes
by which that verdict is reached.5 7
These processes, the rules of evidence and procedure, are not
monolithic: various societal goals, policies, and beliefs require var-
ious methods of implementation and protection. For example, so-
51. The court also rejected the appellant's charges that the trial court abused its
discretion in passing on the qualifications of the petitioner's expert witness.
Id. at 685, 294 N.W.2d at 862. See note 33 supra.
52. 206 Neb. at 681, 294 N.W.2d at 861.
53. See notes 92-96 & accompanying text infra.
54. 206 Neb. at 681, 294 N.W.2d at 861.
55. The cases cited in Danielsen are discussed at notes 93-95 & accompanying
text infra.
56. See Winter, supra note 14, at 335-36.
57. Id.
[T]he goal of our adjudicatory system is not solely reaching 'the' cor-
rect decision; as important as being correct is ensuring that 'a' settle-
ment is in fact reached with reasonable dispatch .... This sacrifice
of truth in the name of dispute settlement is not as harsh as it seems,
however, for a legal system which permitted civil disputes to go on
endlessly-as they would if moral certainty, for example, were the
standard-would satisfy no one except those who revel in chaos.
Id. at 336-37. Endless litigation is even more disfavored than a personally
unpleasant verdict; even if one dislikes a decision, one is disposed to accept
it, or to change it through legislation.
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ciety cherishes a person's life and freedom more highly than it
cherishes a person's money.58 Because life and freedom are at
stake in criminal trials, while economic interests are at stake in
civil trials, a higher burden of persuasion is required in criminal
than in civil trials.59 The burden acts as a shield, preserving the
status quo (life, freedom, or economic interest) until the interest
in preserving the status quo is overcome by the evidence.60
Persuasion is the final process in dispute resolution and is ac-
complished through the use of items of evidence. This evidence
must be produced, and produced in appropriate form61 to make
persuasion possible on rational grounds. Sufficiency, then, is the
penultimate standard in dispute resolution. The failure to produce
sufficient evidence precludes the opportunity to persuade.62
Should not the same social policies which justify different burdens
of persuasion also justify different burdens of production?
At one time, it was maintained that they did not. The "only rea-
sonable inference" test of sufficiency6 3 was employed in criminal
58. The due process clause of the United States Constitution, for example, ranks
property third, behind both life and liberty. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
59. See Winter, supra note 14, at 337. Tests of the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence in criminal cases generally is beyond the scope of this Note. Logi-
cally, the burden of production should reflect the higher burden of persua-
sion involved. See McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A
Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L REv. 1382 (1955). In Ne-
braska, when circumstantial evidence is relied on in a criminal trial, the infer-
ences must relate directly to the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable
doubt in such a way as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion. State v.
Klutts, 204 Neb. 616, 284 N.W.2d 415 (1979). See note 78 infra.
60. See notes 62 & 67 infra.
61. Sufficiency of the evidence depends upon the quality of the evidence
presented, not upon the quantity of the evidence presented. EVIDENCE,
supra note 6, at 1-3; J. MAGUIRE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 180 (1947).
62. Those who wish to change the status quo must show why they should be
allowed. The plaintiff therefore is given three tasks at trial: 1) to present
admissible evidence; 2) to present sufficient evidence; and 3) to present con-
vincing evidence (i.e., he must persuade). These tasks are imposed succes-
sively. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 12. Falling short at any point along the
way stops the process. It is up to the plaintiff to overcome the inertia of the
system: if he fails to accomplish any of his three tasks, he has failed to over-
come that inertia, and he loses (usually on a motion for a directed verdict).
The trial is a weeding out process: each task should require somewhat
more effort than the task before it. See notes 67, 98-102 & accompanying text
infra. If the tests do not progress in this fashion, a plaintiff who has failed to
overcome the inertia of the system remains in court. This unnecessarily pro-
longs litigation and for that reason is an undesirable result.
63. Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion centers on cases involving solely
circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence, by its nature, usually is sufficient
to reach the jury. See note 5 supra. In cases where direct and circumstantial
evidence are mixed, the circumstantial evidence rides in on the coattails of
the direct evidence. The presence of the direct evidence is sufficient to send
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and civil cases alike. As Judge Learned Hand concluded, the dis-
tinction between 'the evidence which would satisfy reasonable
men and the evidence which would satisfy reasonable men beyond
a reasonable doubt ... is too thin for day to day use."6 4 However,
the distinction is made routinely for purposes of persuasion. That
production precedes persuasion should not warrant giving it differ-
ent treatment.65 Certainly, where an ultimate issue is determined
solely by inference from circumstantial evidence, caution is re-
quired. Inference is an imperfect process, 6 6 and the judge has du-
ties to prevent verdicts based on conjecture, speculation, or guess
and to dispense justice properly on the merits of the litigation.6 7
it all to the jury. Nebraska follows this approach. Howell v. Robinson Iron &
Metal Co., 173 Neb. 445, 113 N.W.2d 584 (1962); Halsey v. Merchants Motor
Freight Co., 160 Neb. 732, 71 N.W.2d 311 (1955).
64. Feinberg v. United States, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1944), overruled, United
States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972). Feinberg involved a criminal
prosecution for mail fraud in connection with a corporate acquisition. The
defendants did not deny that there may have been enough evidence to sup-
port a verdict holding them liable in a civil action, but argued that there was
not enough to support a criminal conviction. Hand said the test of sufficiency
was the same for both civil and criminal cases and affirmed the convictions.
The test of sufficiency Hand employed was commensurate with the civil '"rea-
sonable preponderance" test. The quarrel is not with that, but rather with his
insistence that there is only one standard. See McNaughton, supra note 59, at
1389-91.
65. Different treatment for purposes of being able to show that there is more
than one test of sufficiency, that is. It does warrant different treatment for
purposes of the total trial process. See note 62 supra & note 67 infra. It war-
rants more lenient treatment than does persuasion. See notes 70-74 & accom-
panying text infra.
66. Relatively greater numbers of inferences are required to be drawn from cir-
cumstantial evidence than from direct evidence. See C. McCoimucK, supra
note 1, § 338. Therefore, while circumstantial and direct evidence are equally
probative, see note 4 supra, circumstantial evidence is more volatile and is
handled with more care than is direct evidence.
67. If verdicts could be based on speculation or guess, trust in the process of
decision would abate. Courts therefore will not allow juries to return verdicts
plainly contrary to the evidence; thus the existence of such devices to control
the jury as the directed verdict and the judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. For more information on controlling the jury, see James, supra note 1;
Long, supra note 5.
Wigmore argued that there were three possible areas into which an item
of evidence could fall: it could be so unpersuasive that no one reasonably
could believe it; it could be so persuasive that no one reasonably could help
but believe it; it could be more persuasive than the former, but less than the
latter. 9 J. WGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2487. During the production process, any
party always could present evidence and move into a different such area. The
area occupied at the close of evidence would determine whether the case
would go to the jury. Occupation of either of the first two areas would call for
a directed verdict. Id. McNaughton modified Wigmore's approach by show-
ing that evidence falls within a range of probabilities and that the location of
this range within the range of all possibilities will determine whether the
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Experience, 68 however, has demonstrated that in the civil arena 69
the "only reasonable inference" test is overcautious.
Use of the "only reasonable inference" test of sufficiency in a
civil case, where the burden of persuasion is by a preponderance
of the evidence,70 thwarts the normal trial process. Raising the
burden of production effectively raises the burden of persuasion.7 1
If a party relying on circumstantial evidence must prove that the
inference to be drawn from that evidence is the only reasonable
inference, merely to gain jury deliberation, 72 he already has ex-
ceeded the standard he must meet to persuade the jury that he is
entitled to a favorable verdict. Indeed, if a party relying solely on
circumstantial evidence can establish only one reasonable infer-
ence from that evidence, that party is entitled to a directed ver-
dict-the jury need not deliberate at all. "[A] verdict will normally
be directed where both the facts and the inferences to be drawn
from the facts point so strongly in favor of one party that the court
believes that reasonable men could not come to a different
conclusion."73
Under the only reasonable inference test, a party who fails to
establish the inference sought to be proved as the only reasonable
inference has not presented sufficient evidence, and thus fails to
reach the jury. The vast majority of jurisdictions avoid this conun-
drum by holding that in civil cases, if the inference sought to be
proved reasonably preponderates, there is sufficient evidence for
reasoned jury deliberation.74
case goes to the jury. McNaughton, supra note 59, at 1384-89. How much the
middle area, the "sufficient-to-go-to-the-jury" area, will encompass is mea-
sured by the test of sufficiency employed. Once again, the higher the test, the
smaller the number of cases which will obtain jury resolution. See notes 70-
74 & accompanying text infra.
68. See, e.g., cases cited in note 16 supra. See also McNaughton, supra note 59, at
1389-91.
69. Use of the "only reasonable inference" test in criminal cases is justified be-
cause it reflects the presumption of innocence. B. JoNEs, supra note 16,
§ 29:6.
70. "For a court to instruct that a greater degree than a preponderance of the
evidence was necessary [to meet the burden of persuasion] would be the
commission of error." Sowle v. Sowle, 115 Neb. 795, 800, 215 N.W. 122, 126
(1927).
71. See notes 62 & 67 supra.
72. This clearly penalizes the party forced to rely on circumstantial evidence, as
opposed to the party who is able to use direct evidence. A party relying on
direct evidence does not need to establish its likelihood-that question is left
to the jury. See note 5 supra.
73. 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 50.02[11 (2d ed. 1976).
74. See, e.g., cases cited in note 16 supra.
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2. In Nebraska
Nebraska courts long applied the "only reasonable inference"
test vigorously, refusing to let cases reach the jury unless the infer-
ence sought to be proved produced '"moral certainty and convic-
tion."75 However, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence in
a civil case never had to disprove other possible inferences. 76 In
Howell v. Robinson Iron & Metal Co. ,77 the supreme court recited
the "only reasonable inference" test and then said: "In order to
sustain his burden [of production] ... a plaintiff is not bound to
exclude the possibility that the accident might have happened in
some other way."78 This language is not necessarily inconsistent
with the "only reasonable inference" test, as the only reasonable
inference is not the same as the only inference. Very few, if any,
items of circumstantial evidence are susceptible of only one infer-
ence,7 9 but not all inferences carry the same degree of
reasonableness. 80
By the late 1970s, the supreme court had relaxed its application
of the "only reasonable inference" test. At times, the court explic-
itly equated the "only reasonable inference" test with the "reson-
able preponderance" test. In Barkalow Brothers v. Floor-Brite,
Inc.,81 the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's employee was
negligent in performing his janitorial duties, causing a fire which
damaged the plaintiff's building. The plaintiff sought to show, by
75. Tongue v. Perrigo, 130 Neb. 564, 568, 265 N.W. 737, 739 (1936). A father's testi-
mony about the unusual hours kept by one of his daughters and about that
daughter's confession of her love for the defendant, a married man, were held
not sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that the daughter and the defendant
had had sexual relations. The evidence would in all probability fail even
under the lesser "reasonable probabilities" test. The supreme court appar-
ently has abandoned the "moral certainty" language; it never has been ex-
pressly repudiated, however.
76. Howell v. Robinson Iron & Metal Co., 173 Neb. 445, 113 N.W.2d 584 (1962). The
plaintiff had hired the defendant to cut some scrap iron. A fire somehow
started in the warehouse where the cutting had been done. Plaintiff con-
tended the fire had been caused by the defendant's employees' negligence.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and refused to grant a new
trial The plaintiff appealed. The supreme court found for the plaintiff/appel-
lant, finding direct evidence to support three of the plaintiff/appellant's ten
allegations. This finding was sufficient to take the case to the jury; a new trial
was ordered. See note 63 supra.
77. 173 Neb. 445, 113 N.W.2d 584 (1962).
78. Id. at 451, 113 N.W.2d at 590. This is to be contrasted with the Nebraska crimi-
nal rule, which imposes an affirmative duty to exclude all other reasonable
hypotheses. State v. Klutts, 204 Neb. 616, 284 N.W.2d 415 (1979). See note 59
supra.
79. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 338, at 789.
80. This is similar to the distinction between a "preponderance" and a
"probability." See note 14 supra.
81. 188 Neb. 568, 198 N.W.2d 329 (1972).
1981]
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tenuous circumstantial evidence, that the defendant's employee
dumped a lighted cigarette into a fabric collector bag which was
then stored in the room where the fire began. The defendant sug-
gested that the careful dumping of the bag before storage, even
assuming the existence of a lighted cigarette, made the plaintiffs
argument suspect. The defendant also suggested that faulty wir-
ing was at least as likely a cause of the fire as was the mythical
cigarette.8 2 The supreme court agreed with the defendant, stating
that the plaintiff
may establish its case by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evi-
dence, yet circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict un-
less the circumstances proved by the evidence are of such a nature and
[are] so related to each other that the conclusion reached by the jury is the
only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom. Or, to phrase
it differently, the evidence must be sufficient to make the theory of causa-
tion reasonable and not merely possible.8 3
The court said, in effect, that "the only one" and "reasonable" were
merely different ways to describe the same test. As has been
noted, however, 84 the terms are not synonymous. Given the evi-
dence presented, the Floor-Brite finding in favor of the defendant
would have been proper under either test.
At times the court has omitted the "only one" language. In Hos-
ford v. Doherty,85 for example, the court observed that items of cir-
cumstantial evidence, to require submission of the case to the jury,
must be of such a character and so related to each other that "a
conclusion fairly and reasonably arises that the cause of action has
been proved."8 6 In Hosford, the plaintiff had taken his van to the
defendant for a tune-up. The van later began to backfire, and
plaintiff returned the van for further work. The defendant's
mechanic asked a fellow employee to road test the van. The
mechanic had removed the van's cowl cover and air cleaner cover,
but did not replace them before the test. During the test, the van
caught fire. Plaintiff contended that the backfiring caused the fire
and produced expert testimony to the effect that the cowl cover
and air cleaner cover would have retarded the fire, had they been
in place. The mechanic knew the van had been backfiring, and the
record showed he also recognized that flames could come through
the uncovered carburetor. The supreme court held this evidence
sufficient to present a jury question on the issue of the defendant's
82. Id. at 574-75, 198 N.W.2d at 335-36.
83. Id. at 575-76, 198 N.W.2d at 336 (emphasis supplied). "[T]o phrase it differ-
ently" is one of the great understatements of Nebraska judicial history.
84. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
85. 198 Neb. 211, 252 N.W.2d 154 (1977).
86. Id. at 215, 252 N.W.2d at 156 (emphasis supplied).
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negligence.87 This certainly is the correct result under a "reason-
able preponderance" test.
It is difficult to assess the current validity of the "only reason-
able inference" test in Nebraska; the results in all the prior cases
are explainable on other grounds. First, in a number of cases, the
supreme court has found no evidence to sustain the plaintiff's con-
tention;88 hence the plaintiff would have lost even if the "reason-
able preponderance" test had been applied. Second, in some cases
evidence presented by the plaintiff actually favored the defend-
ant's version of the facts.8 9 Finally, many of the cases involved a
mixture of circumstantial and direct evidence;90 they went to the
jury based on the strength of the direct evidence,9' not because of
a judicial relaxation of the "only reasonable inference" test. Even
so, the fact that the Nebraska Supreme Court has equated the
"only reasonable inference" with an inference "reasonably proba-
ble, not merely possible," suggests that the court (though not in
the most coherent fashion) is moving away from a rigid application
of the ostensible rule. Danielsen v. Richar& Manufacturing Co. is
a logical culmination of this liberalization.
87. Id. at 214-15, 252 N.W.2d at 154-56.
88. Bohling v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 141, 214 N.W.2d 381 (1974) (dece-
dent observed slumped over the wheel of his truck as it veered off the road;
no evidence to show he died of other than natural causes); So Soo Feed &
Supply Co. v. Morgan, 192 Neb. 277, 220 N.W.2d 25 (1974) (grain drying bin
caught fire; no evidence as to cause other than vague allegations); Haynes v.
County of Custer, 186 Neb. 740, 186 N.W.2d 483 (1971) (allegedly deteriorated
bridge caused accident; nothing in evidence other than mere allegation as to
time and cause of the bridge's collapse); Norcross v. Gingery, 181 Neb. 782,150
N.W.2d 919 (1967) (plaintiff alleged that he was a partner for 23 years with the
defendant's husband and that as such he was entitled to partition of the part-
nership's land, as there were no written records or accountings during the
entire 23 years, the court held there was no partnership); Bowers v. Maire,
179 Neb. 239, 137 N.W.2d 796 (1965) (auto accident; no evidence as to weight
and speed of vehicles, hence insufficient to establish fault).
89. This can occur either by the plaintiff's presentation of evidence favorable to
the defendant, or by the improbability of the plaintiff's version of the facts.
Sherman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 Neb. 104, 225 N.W.2d 547 (1975) (wall on
plaintiff's building collapsed; plaintiff sued under windstorm clause of insur-
ance contract; one of plaintiffs own witnesses testified that it was possible for
natural winds or elements acting daily on the structure to cause its fall); JIL
Watkins Co. v. Wiley, 184 Neb. 144, 165 N.W.2d 585 (1969) (plaintiff sued de-
fendant's employer on a surety contract; the employer claimed that an un-
identified stranger represented the paper as a character recommendation,
and no connection between this stranger and the plaintiff was shown).
90. See, e.g., Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179,22 N.W.2d 614 (1946) (auto-pedes-
trian accident; both parties testified as to their actions; question of contribu-
tory negligence sent to the jury on the strength of the direct evidence).
91. Id. See note 63 supra.
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B. Danieften
The Nebraska Supreme Court correctly distinguished the foun-
dational evidence in Danielsen from the foundational evidence in
the cases relied upon by the appellant.92 In Barkalow Brothers v.
Floor-Brite, Inc. ,93 there was no evidence supporting the plaintiff's
claim, as the plaintiff simply assumed the existence of some of the
circumstances necessary to establish its case. In Popken v. Farm-
ers Mutual Home Insurance Co.,94 the evidence favored the de-
fendant's explanation for the deaths of the plaintiff's cattle. In So
Soo Feed & Supply Co. v. Morgan,95 the record was "devoid as to
any explanation as to what... could [have] cause[d] the fire." 96
In Danielsen, by contrast, there was a good deal of evidence favor-
ing each party's contentions.
The Danielsen decision clearly repudiates use of the "only rea-
sonable inference" test in Nebraska. Unfortunately, it also implic-
itly repudiates use of the "reasonably probable" test. More
unfortunately, the court has not rejected the language of the older
decisions. There was, in this case, evidence favoring the plaintiff's
contention. However, this evidence was counterbalanced by evi-
dence favoring the defendant distributor's contention. There was
nothing in the evidence to justify a choice between these conten-
92. For appellant's discussion of the cases, see Brief for Appellant at 41-45.
93. 188 Neb. 568, 198 N.W.2d 329 (1972). See notes 81-83 & accompanying text
supra.
94. 180 Neb. 250, 142 N.W.2d 309 (1966). In Popken, the plaintiffs cattle drowned
when a severe wind and rainstorm caused flash flooding. The plaintiff sued
on an insurance policy covering "loss or damage by fire and lightning, tornado
and windstorm." Id. at 251,142 N.W.2d at 310. The policy did not cover loss by
drowning.
Plaintiff's fenced pasture had high ground in the center and was bisected
by a creek. The cattle were seen on the upstream low ground five minutes
before the storm hit. After the storm, four cattle were on the high ground,
and forty were scattered more than a mile downsteam. Twenty-three of these
were drowned.
Plaintiff claimed that the four on the high ground showed that all the cat-
tle had worked back to high ground before the storm, and it was the storm
which drove them into the flooded area. If the storm had done this, it would
have been held to have been the cause of the loss, and the plaintiff would
have recovered under the policy. Defendant contended that the cattle stayed
on the low ground and drifted with the wind along the fence until they were
swept away by the flood. The supreme court thought that the inferences
were equally balanced. Id. at 256, 142 N.W.2d at 315. It remanded the case
with instructions to direct a verdict for the defendant. Id. The number of
cattle found on the low ground and the observed position of the cattle just
five minutes before the storm, however, favored the defendant's version of
the incident.
95. 192 Neb. 277, 220 N.W.2d 25 (1974). See note 88 supra.
96. 192 Neb. at 279, 220 N.W.2d at 27.
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tions,97 as the jury's inability to come to a decision tends to
suggest.
This would not be a problem, if direct evidence were in issue:
direct evidence is sufficient to reach the jury on the question of
credibility.98 Even though circumstantial evidence has probative
value equal to that of direct evidence,99 the number of inferences
to be dealt with in cases of circumstantial evidence justify more
caution. A decision cannot properly be based on speculation.100
The court, in effect, said that the credibility question alone can
take circumstantial evidence to the jury. If that practice is fol-
lowed in future decisions, equally balanced probabilities will have
been rendered sufficient, in a Nebraska civil case, to let the jury
deliberate. Thus the pendulum swings from one unfavorable hold-
ing to another: from the "only reasonable inference" to-in ef-
fect-very little at all. Choosing between equally balanced
possibilities amounts to speculation. The purpose of the rules for
measuring the burdens of production and persuasion is to resolve
ties.101 If the plaintiff, relying on circumstantial evidence, cannot
produce enough evidence to show that his position is at least more
likely than not, he should not reach the jury, for he has failed to
produce sufficient evidence for meaningful deliberation.
Use of an "equal probabilities" test would comport with Ne-
braska's test for sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a jury ver-
dict. However, the tests should not be mirror images of one
another sufficiency to get to the jury means that enough evidence
is present to allow a jury to come to a well-reasoned decision; suffi-
ciency to uphold a verdict means that a comparison of the evidence
and the verdict will show that the jury was not clearly wrong in the
decision it made. The tests should interrelate. A finding of suffi-
ciency to uphold the verdict normally is a finding of sufficiency to
reach the jury. As long as Nebraska courts adhere to the "only rea-
sonable inference" test, however, the tests cannot properly interre-
late. Findings of sufficiency to uphold the verdict would become
automatic, hence superfluous. The Nebraska Supreme Court has
recognized that
97. The appellant contended that there was something in the record to justify a
reasonable choice. The supreme court quickly dismissed this, saying, "An
examination of Richards' arguments in its brief discloses that its real argu-
ment is that its expert is better and more competent than the plaintiffs ex-
pert. This may be true, but it was a matter for the jury to decide in weighing
the testimony." 206 Neb. at 684, 294 N.W.2d at 862. See notes 100-01 & accom-
panying text infra.
98. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
99. See note 4 supra.
100. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
101. See note 61 supra.
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[a] motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict must be treated as an admission of the truth of all material and
relevant evidence submitted on behalf of the party against whom the mo-
tion is directed. Such party is entitled to have every controverted fact re-
solved in his favor and to have the benefit of every inference which can
reasonably be deduced from the evidence. 10 2
An inference no longer need be the only reasonable one to allow
the plaintiff to reach the jury. Until the decision in Danielsen,
however, the court never actually used an "equal probabilities"
test in determining whether the petitioner had carried the burden
of production. Because the old language was recited in Danielsen,
however, it is not certain whether a choice between equally proba-
ble inferences will be given to the jury in the future.
An attorney confronted with a product liability case similar to
Danielsen may be able to sidestep the Danielsen dilemma by join-
ing all possible defendants and shifting the burden to them to es-
tablish that they did not contribute to the injury. 0 3 Unfortunately,
the extent to which the result in Danielsen is attributable to sym-
pathy for an injured woman whose attorney did not join all possi-
ble defendants, and how much is attributable to a genuine intent
to change the case law, cannot be determined until the supreme
court has had another opportunity to address the issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The overall practical effect of the decision in Danielsen is posi-
tive: it gives the plaintiff in a civil case a burden of production
commensurate with the civil burden of persuasion. 0 4 It aligns the
test of sufficiency to reach the jury and sufficiency to uphold the
verdict. However, the decision perpetuates as many problems as it
solves. By giving equally balanced probabilities (on the facts of
this case) to the jury, the court may have overbalanced in favor of
the plaintiff. This could have serious precedential'repercussions.
Courts are free-within reason-to shift their approach to sub-
stantive rules of law, unless constrained by positive law. The Ne-
102. Davidson v. Simmons, 203 Neb. 804, 808, 280 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1979) (emphasis
supplied).
103. This argument would be based on the well-known California case Summers v.
Tice, 190 P.2d 963 (Cal App.), vacated, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In that
case, the plaintiff, while out hunting, was struck by a bullet from another
gun--even given all the facts and circumstances that could be shown, it was
just as likely that the bullet had come from the gun of one defendant as it was
that it had come from the gun of the other defendant. The court held that
once the plaintiff could establish that any of the defendants could have
caused the plaintiff's injury, the burden shifts to each defendant to show that
it did not cause the plaintiff's injury.
104. For the effect of using too high a test of sufficiency, see notes 70-74 & accompa-
nying text supra.
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braska Rules of Evidence are silent on the subject of the
sufficiency of the evidence;105 the supreme court committed no
breach by changing the rule. Shifting the substantive law, while
restating the effectively repudiated language, however, is careless.
As long as the court insists that two semantically and legally dis-
tinguishable phrases are equivalent, it breeds confusion and un-
certainty. If the court intends, as the holding in Danielsen seems
to suggest, given the nature of the evidence, to make these phrases
stand for yet a third test, the court has compounded its careless-
ness. At the very least, the supreme court should eradicate the
"only reasonable inference" language. It is meaningless verbiage,
given the factual patterns of the court's recent decisions. 106 In-
deed, preserving the language is dangerous: a court with a narrow
view of the jury's function would be able to seize that language and
apply it literally, wrongfully prying all cases from the jury's
grasp. 07 The availability of appeal should minimize the danger,
but that is cold comfort to plaintiffs who must rely on circumstan-
tial evidence to prove their claims. In Danielsen v. Richards Manu-
facturing Co., the Nebraska Supreme Court was presented an
opportunity to render comprehensible its prior rulings on the suffi-
ciency of circumstantial evidence. The court chose instead to in-
crease the confusion. Only further litigation will clarify the
current Nebraska practice.
Karen Ann Montee '82
105. See generally NEB. . EvD.
106. See notes 75-91 & accompanying text supra.
107. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.

